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I. INTRODUCTION
Employers use groom and dress policies to broadly regulate the 
appearance of employees, dictating all aspects from the most basic 
appearance requirements, such as cleanliness and proper attire, down to 
the minutest details, including hair style, nail length, and even lipstick 
color.1  However, when an employer differentiates between male and 
female employees in appearance policies, the employer runs the risk of 
violating Title VII, a federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in 
the workplace.2  Title VII was enacted to eradicate the discriminatory 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes, and to 
eliminate the traditional obstacles faced by women entering the 
workforce.3  The Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits an 
employer from differentiating between men and women in a wide 
variety of employment settings, including application qualifications,4
promotion decisions,5 and retirement plans,6 but has not yet addressed 
whether policies that regulate aspects of an employee’s appearance fall 
within the ambit of Title VII.  In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, 
circuit courts have developed multiple, often conflicting tests to determine 
whether an employer runs afoul of Title VII when it imposes different 
appearance requirements upon male and female employees.  This Comment 
proposes a comprehensive framework for analyzing groom and dress 
 1. For example, see Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy as detailed in Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), which heavily 
regulated the appearance of female employees by allowing only specific nail polish 
colors and hair styles while mandating makeup in “complimentary” colors.  See infra
text accompanying notes 16–20. 
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 3. The U.S. Supreme Court once noted:  
“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.  [Title VII] subjects to 
scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and 
enjoyment which have plagued women in the past.” 
City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) 
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). 
4. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971) (holding 
that an employer’s policy of refusing applications from women with school-aged 
children while accepting applications from men with school-aged children violated Title 
VII).
5. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (holding that an 
employer’s refusal to promote an employee, motivated by stereotypical notions about a 
woman’s proper demeanor, violated Title VII), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994). 
6. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711 (holding that an employer’s requirement that 
women make larger contributions into the company’s pension fund than men violated 
Title VII). 
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policies under Title VII that will ensure consistency among the circuits, 
remain faithful to Supreme Court precedent, and restore focus on the 
original intent of Title VII. 
Part II of this Comment introduces Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co., a controversial Ninth Circuit opinion that illustrates both the myriad 
problems encountered in existing groom and dress tests as well as the 
advantages of this Comment’s proposed approach.  Part III explores the 
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of Title VII to prohibit both blatant 
and subtle forms of employment discrimination arising out of sex 
stereotypes.7 Despite this expansive precedent, many courts have utilized 
theories that impose limitations on the protections of Title VII against 
discriminatory groom and dress policies.8  For example, one of these 
tests is the mutability doctrine, which bars any consideration of 
appearance policies under Title VII by asserting that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination only on the basis of immutable characteristics.9  Another 
is the offensive stereotype analysis, which further limits the application 
of Title VII by allowing courts to impose or withhold statutory 
protection based on subjective views of the permissibility of certain 
gender stereotypes.10  The unequal burdens test also undercuts the 
strength of Title VII by only looking to the financial and temporal costs 
of complying with a groom and dress policy, thus failing to consider the 
psychological burden of being forced to conform to an oppressive sex 
stereotype.11 As Part IV of this Comment asserts, the mutability doctrine, 
the offensive stereotype analysis, and the unequal burdens test all serve 
 7. Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination as well as discrimination 
resulting from a general practice or policy.  E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”). 
 8. Indeed, these limiting tests may have developed as a method to balance the 
apparent breadth of the statute with employer prerogative.  Though there is considerable 
merit in the notion of balancing the rights of employers with those of employees, this 
Author believes that the existing circuit court tests unduly limit the ability of employees 
to use Title VII for its intended purpose—to fight sex discrimination—in favor of a 
nearly unrestrained right of employers to impose discriminatory appearance policies. 
 9. The mutability doctrine was widely adopted in the decades following the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act by courts in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits and the D.C. Circuit.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 10. The offensive stereotype analysis has been applied to groom and dress polices 
by courts in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits and the D.C. Circuit.  See infra Part 
IV.B. 
 11. The unequal burdens test was developed and is used primarily by courts in the 
Ninth Circuit.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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to limit the effectiveness of Title VII by creating various exceptions and 
loopholes within the statute’s blanket prohibition against sex discrimination.  
Ironically, these theories often result in allowing employers to promulgate 
groom and dress policies that reinforce the very stereotypes and employment 
obstacles that Congress intended to eliminate with the passage of Title 
VII.  Thus, in Part V, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to address 
the inconsistencies among the circuits by implementing a new, two-
pronged approach to groom and dress policies under Title VII. 
This new framework rejects the mutability doctrine as a misinterpretation 
of Title VII language and Supreme Court precedent, but it retains and 
refines aspects of the offensive stereotype analysis and the unequal 
burdens test.  The first step in the proposed approach asks the Court to 
consider whether the policy relies upon stereotypes that tend to reinforce 
gender subordination in the workplace, rather than simply focusing on 
whether the Court deems the policy subjectively offensive.  The second 
step of the test requires the Court to engage in an expanded unequal 
burdens analysis by examining a broader variety of factors—including 
the financial, temporal, physical, and emotional costs of the policy—to 
determine whether the policy imposes a heavier burden on one sex over 
the other.  This new approach remains faithful to legislative intent and 
Supreme Court precedent by addressing and eradicating the special 
barriers and disadvantages faced by women in the workforce.  Properly 
applied, the two-pronged test harmonizes employee and employer 
interests by targeting policies that further gender inequality while still 
allowing employers to maintain reasonable discretion over groom and 
dress requirements. 
II. DARLENE JESPERSEN
Imagine a woman faced with this distressing ultimatum: conform to 
her employer’s stereotypical notions about the way women should look 
and compromise her self-dignity, or stand her ground and lose the 
successful career that she has cultivated for nearly twenty years.  This 
was the situation in which Darlene Jespersen found herself when her 
employer, Harrah’s Casino, informed her that she would be terminated if 
she refused to comply with the extensive new makeup requirements that 
applied to female employees only.12  Jespersen had worked as a bartender at 
 12. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 
2004), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECR-
VPC), 2002 WL 32980097 (“Consequently, Ms. Jespersen refused to comply with the 
makeup requirement, and, she was terminated.”). 
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Harrah’s in Reno, Nevada, for almost two decades.13  Over the course of 
her career, she received performance appraisals ranging from “successful” 
to “exceptional” and emphasizing her reliability, positive attitude, and 
ability to remain calm in the high volume, fast-paced atmosphere of 
Harrah’s Sports Bar.14  By all accounts, Jespersen was a valuable and 
popular employee.  She was abruptly terminated, however, due to her 
strong objection to and refusal to comply with Harrah’s newly instituted 
“Personal Best” appearance policy.15
The policy imposed a variety of groom and dress requirements on 
employees, some that applied to all employees, regardless of sex, and 
some that applied only to male or female employees.16  All employees 
were required to wear the specified uniform—consisting of a white shirt, 
black pants, a black vest, and a black bowtie—and to appear “well 
groomed.”17  As to the gender-specific requirements, male employees 
were prohibited from growing their hair below the collar and wearing 
makeup or nail polish, while female employees were required to wear 
stockings, adorn colored nail polish, and wear their hair “teased, curled, 
or styled.”18  Harrah’s later amended the “Personal Best” policy to require 
female employees to apply a daily facial uniform of makeup, including 
face powder, blush, mascara, and lipstick in complimentary colors.19
Under the policy, supervisors monitored female employees daily, 
comparing their appearances to photographs taken after the company-
hired image consultants performed a “makeover” on every woman.20
Jespersen had never worn makeup in either her personal or professional 
life.  On a personal level, she refused to wear makeup because it 
“conflict[ed] with her self-image” and she found it “offensive.”21  On a 
professional level, she felt so uncomfortable wearing makeup at work 
 13. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc). 
 14. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Employee 
Evaluations, Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECR-VPC), 2002 
WL 32980105. 
15. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106. 




 20. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
21. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
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that she found it interfered with her job performance.22  She stated that 
she felt “sick, degraded, exposed, and violated” when forced to wear 
makeup to work.23  In addition, Jespersen found that wearing makeup 
actually impaired her ability to be an effective bartender because her 
customers, especially the drunken, unruly ones, viewed her as less credible 
and authoritative when she was “dolled up.”24  Although Harrah’s had 
promised that the new policy was about “looking and feeling your 
best,”25 it demanded that she comply with the makeup requirement or 
she would lose her job.26  Despite increasing pressure from Harrah’s 
management, Jespersen refused to wear the required makeup uniform.27
After twenty years of “exemplary” service, Harrah’s terminated Jespersen 
for her decision not to comply with the makeup requirement.28
Unfortunately for Jespersen, the courts provided no relief. After 
exhausting her administrative remedies,29 Jespersen filed suit against her 
former employer in district court, alleging that the Personal Best policy 
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.30 Title VII 
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin,” unless the discriminatory policy is a 
22. Id.
23. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077. 
24. Id.; Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight 
Against the Barbie-fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 298–99 
(2007).
 25. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, Exhibit C, 
Beverage Department “Personal Best” Program (emphasis added). 
 26. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. Nev. 
2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“Defendant told her that compliance [with the policy] was mandatory.  When 
Plaintiff still refused to comply . . . .  Defendant thereafter terminated Plaintiff’s employment.”). 
 27. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada et al. in 
Support of Plaintiff/Appellant at 4, Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 
24133171 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. 
28. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006). 
29. Amicus Brief, supra note 27; Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.  Under Title VII, a 
plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the statute’s provisions must file a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days “after the alleged 
unlawful employment practice occurred.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).  If, however, the 
plaintiff first institutes proceedings with a state or local agency “with authority to grant 
or seek relief from such practice,” the time for filing a charge with the EEOC is extended 
to 300 days.  Id.  Here, Jespersen first filed suit with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission 
and then filed her Title VII discrimination claim with the EEOC.  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 
1108.  For further discussion of the procedural requirements of filing a Title VII discrimination 
claim, see EEOC, FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING JOB DISCRIMINATION: QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html.  See also Russell Specter & 
Paul Spiegelman, Employment Discrimination Action Under Federal Civil Rights Acts,
21 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1974). 
30. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. 
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“bona fide occupational qualification.”31  In court, Jespersen asserted 
two theories of sex discrimination.  First, she argued that the policy imposed 
an unequal burden on female employees by requiring a daily facial uniform 
of makeup, while male employees had no equivalent facial requirement.32
Second, Jespersen argued that the makeup requirement was impermissibly 
based on sex stereotypes.33
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted Harrah’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that the Personal Best policy 
imposed equal burdens on both male and female bartenders and that the 
policy was not impermissibly based on sex stereotypes.34  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed Jespersen’s Title VII challenge to the Personal 
Best policy twice: first in 2004 before a three-judge panel,35 and again in 
2006 following a rehearing en banc.36  In the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected Jespersen’s unequal burden claim due to her failure to develop a 
record regarding the financial and temporal cost of complying with the 
makeup requirement,37 and it rejected her sex stereotyping claim due to 
her failure to prove that the Personal Best policy was impermissibly 
motivated by offensive sex stereotypes.38  Applying these standards, the 
Ninth Circuit put an end to Jespersen’s legal battle. 
With the facts of Jespersen and other circuit authority as a backdrop, 
this Comment will illustrate that the theories and tests relied upon by 
courts across the country misinterpret the language and intent of Title 
VII and undermine Supreme Court precedent. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e)(1) (2000).  Title VII permits an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of sex in those instances in which sex is a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business or enterprise.  § 2000e-2(e)(1).  The BFOQ defense is a very narrow 
statutory defense and turns on the particular facts and circumstances of the job at issue.  
E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).  Here, because Harrah’s did not 
argue that the “Personal Best” policy constituted a BFOQ, this Comment will not engage 
in a comprehensive analysis of the BFOQ.  For information and sources regarding the 
BFOQ defense, see infra note 114. 
32. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107–08. 
33. Id. at 1108. 
34. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93.  Regarding Jespersen’s sex stereotyping 
claim, the district court specifically held that the policy did not violate Title VII because 
it did not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race, sex, or 
national origin.  Id. at 1192–94.  This theory will be addressed infra Part IV.A. 
 35. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d on 
reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
36. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104. 
37. Id. at 1110. 
38. Id. at 1112–13. 
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III. TITLE VII: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE SUPREME COURT
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination 
in a broad variety of settings, including voting rights, public 
accommodations, schools, government agencies, and employment.39
Title VII of the Act specifically prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against any individual in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment” on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin,” 
unless the discriminatory policy fits into the bona fide occupational 
qualification defense.40  However, the initial draft of Title VII did not 
include sex as a protected category, and the last minute addition of sex to 
the bill left courts and commentators with little legislative history to help 
guide the statute’s interpretation.41
One prevalent theory is that congressional opponents of the civil rights 
legislation proposed the addition of sex in order to load down the bill 
with politically unfavorable features in an effort to defeat the entire Civil 
Rights Act.42  However, others assert that this theory fails to adequately 
explain the strong, repeated support for the sex amendment in the House 
and Senate.43  Despite any questionable motives of the members who 
 39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e)(1) (2000).  For example, Title VII prohibits an 
employer from taking tangible actions, such as termination, demotion, or reduction in 
pay or benefits, based on discrimination against a protected class.  More specifically, the 
Supreme Court established that the statute’s provision on sex discrimination also 
prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, based on either a hostile work 
environment claim or a quid pro quo claim of sexual extortion.  See Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986).  However, the Court has not yet spoken directly 
regarding whether a groom and dress policy may violate the Title VII sex discrimination 
provision.
41. See, e.g., Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63–64 (“The prohibition against discrimination 
based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. . . .  [T]he bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little 
legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination 
based on ‘sex.’”). 
42. See Arthur B. Smith, Jr., The Law and Equal Employment Opportunity: What’s 
Past Should Not Be Prologue, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 504 (1980) (“The sex 
discrimination prohibitions of Title VII have no legislative history: the provision was 
added as a tactic by Southern congressmen to secure defeat of the civil rights bill’s race 
discrimination provisions.”); see also Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: 
The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of 
Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 453 (1981) (“The conventional view is that 
sex was added as a protected class to the employment discrimination title of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 . . . for the purpose of defeating it by making it unacceptable to some 
of its supporters or by laughing it to death.”) (footnote omitted). 
 43. For further discussion on why the conventional explanations of the sex 
amendment fail, see Gold, supra note 42.  Gold argues that the conventional explanations are 
inadequate because they are inherently unlikely, especially considering Congress does 
not often pass laws based on a “joke”; they provide no assistance in construing the sex 
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initially proposed the sex amendment, both the House and Senate 
approved the amendment with the requisite majorities,44 and Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act without a single change to the sex 
discrimination provision.45 Further, legislative reports issued in the wake 
of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII spoke forcefully against sex 
discrimination, and emphasized the importance of enforcing the sex 
discrimination provision of Title VII with the same vigor and 
seriousness as the rest of the protected categories.46  Today, most courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have come to agree that by adding sex as a 
protected category under Title VII, Congress intended to eradicate the 
offensive and outmoded sex stereotypes that limit employment opportunities 
for women.47 Thus, when employers use discriminatory groom and dress 
discrimination ban; and “they do not account for the remarks of Representatives who 
spoke in favor of the amendment.” Id. at 460.  Gold’s close examination of the 
congressional record on that day in fact reveals a serious debate about the amendment, 
primarily focusing on whether white women would be left without protection unless the 
sex amendment passed.  Id. at 463–67. 
44. See Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a 
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 176–77 (1991) (describing how, on 
February 8, 1964, the House approved the “sex” amendment 168 to 133); Gold, supra
note 42, at 461 (noting that, on February 10, 1964, the House approved the amendment 
again on a revote). 
45. See 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964); see also Gold, supra note 42, at 457. 
 46. For example, after the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, Senators Clifford 
Case of New Jersey and Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, the bipartisan comanagers of the 
Act, issued an interpretive memorandum of the bill, which provided broad support for 
the prohibitions of Title VII.  See 110 CONG. REC. 7212–14 (1964). The memorandum 
encouraged the use of an expansive definition of discrimination.  Id. at 7213.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has often relied on the Clark-Case Memorandum to clarify legislative 
intent behind Title VII.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982); Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350–51 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1971).  A few years later, in 1972, the House Committee on 
Education and Labor also issued a report on Title VII that specifically addressed sex 
discrimination.  The report stated: 
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. . . .  Such blatantly disparate 
treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has 
specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964. . . .  
Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited 
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern 
given to any type of unlawful discrimination. 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4–5 (1971). 
47. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 
(7th Cir. 1971)) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of 
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”); Rodriguez v. Bd. of Educ.,620 F.2d 362, 
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policies to impose stereotypical image—policies that ultimately hinder 
women in achieving professionalism and respect in the workplace—those 
employers effectively undermine Congress’s goal of dispelling sex 
stereotypes. 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the 
implications of Title VII for groom and dress policies, the Court has 
applied Title VII sex discrimination in the analogous contexts of 
employment qualifications and employer decisionmaking. Two landmark 
decisions provide crucial guidance to lower courts.  The first decision, 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., established what many courts and 
commentators call the “sex-plus” doctrine, which expands Title VII 
to prohibit the more subtle method of discrimination on the basis of 
sex plus an otherwise neutral characteristic.48 In Phillips, an employer 
refused to accept employment applications from women with preschool-
aged children, but it had no similar restriction against employing men 
with young children.49  The Supreme Court first noted that Title VII 
requires “that persons of like qualifications be given employment 
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” and thus held that maintaining 
one employment standard for females and another for males constituted 
Title VII sex discrimination.50  Although significant for its application of 
Title VII to employment qualifications, the majority opinion in Phillips
was extremely brief and did not explain the Court’s reasoning.  Justice 
Marshall’s more demonstrative concurrence, however, has since gained 
regard as the opinion that created the sex-plus doctrine. 
366 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[S]ex stereotyping may once have been a virtually unquestioned 
feature of our national life, [but] it will no longer be tolerated.”); Austin v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (“The legislative history 
accompanying the passage of the 1972 amendments makes clear that the primary thrust 
of Title VII was to discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment 
disadvantages for one sex.”). 
48. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971).  One 
observer noted: 
   Although the Phillips Court’s terse opinion did not offer any detailed 
explanation for its conclusion that the plaintiff at least had made a prima facie
showing that she had been subjected to a sex-based employment practice, it did 
not take the lower courts long to draw an ill-conceived doctrine out of the 
Court’s sparse text. . . .  A facially sex-differentiated policy that excluded a 
sub-group of women could, in the absence of a BFOQ-based justification, 
violate the statutory ban on sex-based discrimination. . . . 
   The lower courts promptly fashioned a broad limitation to the Court’s ruling 
in Phillips—the doctrinally misleading “sex-plus” theory. 
Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 207 (2007) (footnotes 
omitted). 
49. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543. 
50. Id. at 544. 
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In his concurrence, Marshall first asserted that by adding the 
prohibition against sex discrimination to Title VII, “Congress intended 
to prevent employers from refusing to hire an individual based on 
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”51  Marshall then wrote that 
where “performance characteristics” of employees or applicants are 
concerned, “employment opportunity may be limited only by employment 
criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.”52 Thus, an 
employer may not condition performance characteristics on gender.  As 
lower courts applied and interpreted the Phillips opinion, the sex-plus 
doctrine came to stand for the principle that discrimination against a 
subclass of one sex violates Title VII as much as discrimination against 
the entire sex.53  In other words, an employer may not discriminate on 
the basis of sex plus an otherwise neutral characteristic—for example, 
being female plus having young children. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued another significant Title VII sex 
discrimination opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54  For the first 
time, the Court acknowledged that an employer violates Title VII when 
it relies upon sex stereotypes in making employment decisions.  In Price
Waterhouse, the plaintiff, a senior manager at an accounting firm, was 
denied partnership despite her great success with the firm, and then told 
by a partner to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” in 
order to improve her chances for reconsideration.55  Other partners 
described her as “macho,” told her that she “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” and advised her to take “a course at a charm school.”56  The 
Court broadly stated that Title VII required that “gender must be irrelevant 
to employment decisions,” and thus, “[t]he critical inquiry . . . is whether 
gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was 
made.”57 The Court then held that the partnership decision was 
51. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
52. Id. at 547. 
53. See Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (“[The sex-plus] line of cases rests on the theory that disparate treatment of a male 
or female subclass violates Title VII since the employer has added a factor for one sex 
that is not added to the other sex as a condition of employment.”). 
 54. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 251 (1994). 
55. Id. at 235 (citation omitted). 
56. Id. (citations omitted). 
57. Id. at 240–41 (emphasis omitted). 
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impermissibly motivated by stereotypical notions about a woman’s 
proper demeanor and by the plaintiff’s apparent failure to conform to 
gender stereotypes.58  Further, the Court noted, “[W]e are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .”59
This deceptively simple statement paved the way for a new method of 
attacking sex discrimination in the workplace: the sex stereotyping 
claim.60  This claim allows plaintiffs in Title VII cases to introduce 
evidence that an employment decision was made, at least in part, due to 
a sex stereotype.61
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of Title VII 
in Phillips and Price Waterhouse, circuit courts have responded to 
groom and dress challenges by creating various limitations and 
exceptions to Title VII’s broad prohibition against sex discrimination.  
As Part IV will explain, these theories are unsound because they 
contradict Supreme Court precedent, misinterpret the purpose of Title 
VII, and allow employers to perpetuate the same sexist stereotypes that 
Title VII intended to eradicate. 
IV. A CROSS-CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF GROOM AND DRESS                   
POLICIES UNDER TITLE VII
A.  The Mutability Doctrine: An Absolute Right to Discriminate? 
The mutability doctrine imposes a tremendous limitation on Title VII 
by interpreting the statute to prohibit discrimination based only on 
immutable characteristics that cannot be changed, such as sex, race, and 
58. Id. at 256. 
59. Id. at 251. 
 60. The sex stereotyping claim has met some success in Title VII groom and dress 
challenges.  See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–
33 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring women to wear uniforms but allowing men to wear 
business attire was based on “demeaning” stereotypes about women); O’Donnell v. 
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) 
(requiring female sales clerks at a retail store to wear smocks, while allowing male sales 
clerks to wear a shirt and tie, perpetuated sexual stereotypes); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 
337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (holding that employer may not base its 
regulations on gender stereotypes, such as “women are the weaker sex,” without 
violating Title VII).  But see Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 
1985) (requiring female news station anchors to appear feminine and soft on the air was 
not based on impermissible stereotypes); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
402, 402–03 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring short hair for males was not an attempt to 
stereotype employees).  For further discussion of the sex stereotyping claim, see infra
Part IV.B. 
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51. 
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national origin.62  Under this doctrine, groom and dress policies could 
never violate Title VII because an employee’s appearance is alterable.  
Thus, under the mutability doctrine, a policy that discriminates between 
men and women based on appearance does not, and indeed cannot, 
constitute sex discrimination. 
The view that groom and dress policies cannot violate Title VII is 
most strongly expressed in the first notable group of groom and dress 
challenges brought after the passage of Title VII.  Known as the “haircut 
cases,” these cases involved a male employee challenging an employer’s 
appearance policy that prohibited long hair for males but had no 
equivalent hair length restriction for females.63  A majority of federal 
courts upheld the hair length policies,64 reasoning that Congress intended 
 62. The mutability doctrine was widely adopted by courts in the decade following 
the passage of Title VII, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and the D.C. 
Circuit.  For example, the Fourth Circuit held: 
[D]iscrimination based on either immutable sex characteristics or 
constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or child rearing violate 
the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] because they present obstacles to employment 
of one sex that cannot be overcome. . . .  [However,] discrimination based on 
factors of personal preference does not necessarily restrict employment 
opportunities and thus is not forbidden. 
Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).  See also
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of “immutable characteristics, such 
as race and national origin”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 
1974) (holding that Title VII addresses discrimination based on characteristics that “the 
applicant, otherwise qualified, ha[s] no power to alter”); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register 
Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Congress has said that no exercise of that 
responsibility may result in discriminatory deprivation of equal opportunity because of 
immutable race, national origin, color, or sex classification.”); Thomas v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (holding that distinctions in 
employment practices between men and women on the basis of something other than 
immutable characteristics or legally protected rights do not inhibit employment 
opportunities in violation of Title VII); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 
141, 145 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (“Rules and regulations of employers based on personal, 
mutable characteristics of men, used by the employer to choose one or more men over 
other men in the various aspects of employment, do not discriminate against men on the 
basis of sex.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 63. For an examination of the historical and legal issues involved in the haircut 
cases, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75–80 (1995). 
64. See, e.g., Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092; Baker, 507 F.2d at 898; Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 
F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1126. But see Aros v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that a hair length 
restriction for male employees violates Title VII: “A dress and grooming code . . . must 
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for sex to be interpreted in the same way as the other protected 
categories of race, color, and national origin.  In doing so, these courts 
interpreted Title VII to forbid discrimination only on the basis of 
immutable characteristics.65  Because hair length is a mutable characteristic, 
policies regulating hair length for men simply do not implicate the rights 
and protections of Title VII.66
The mutability doctrine should be discarded because it directly 
contradicts Supreme Court precedent.  In Phillips, the Court invalidated 
an employer’s policy against hiring women with school-aged children, 
holding that employers could not have one hiring policy for men and 
another for women.67  Justice Marshall’s concurrence further instructed 
that “[w]hen performance characteristics of an individual are involved, 
even when parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may 
be limited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of 
the applicant.”68  This case suggests that a policy based on mutable 
characteristics may be found to violate Title VII, as having children of a 
certain age is not an immutable trait, but was still considered by the 
Court to be a discriminatory criterion.  Correctly interpreting the Phillips
opinion, the Seventh Circuit in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc. invalidated 
an employer policy that required only female employees to be 
unmarried.69  The court held that enforcing the no-marriage rule against 
women but not men constituted sex discrimination.70  Although marriage 
is a mutable trait, the court deemed it to be a discriminatory distinction, 
which again undermines the central premise of the mutability doctrine.  
be applied equally to everyone.  It may not establish different standards for males and 
females; it may not discriminate on the basis of sex”). 
65. See Baker, 507 F.2d at 897 (“Since race, national origin and color represent 
immutable characteristics, logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense rather than to 
indicate personal modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”); see also Willingham, 507 F.2d at 
1092 (“Private employers are prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and 
women only when the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics or legally 
protected rights.”). 
66. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“Equal employment opportunity may be 
secured only when employers are barred from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 67. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
68. Id. at 547 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 69. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).  The 
court noted that Congress specifically rejected an amendment to Title VII that would 
have limited the prohibition to discrimination based “solely” on sex, and reasoned that 
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination that adversely affects only a portion of a 
protected class.  Id. at 1198 & n.4.  Thus, distinguishing between married women and 
unmarried women was discriminatory.  Id. at 1198. 
70. Id. at 1198. 
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The inherent contradiction between these cases and the earlier haircut 
cases demonstrates that the mutability doctrine cannot be salvaged. 
Perhaps predicting this criticism, the Fifth Circuit attempted to 
conform the mutability doctrine to Supreme Court and other circuit court 
precedent by holding that Phillips and Sprogis dealt with “fundamental 
rights”—the fundamental right to have children and to marry, 
respectively—and thus expanded its interpretation of Title VII to prohibit 
discrimination based on immutable characteristics or fundamental 
rights.71  However, this expansion only serves to illustrate the weakness 
of the mutability doctrine, as the exceptions and inconsistencies nearly 
swallow the rule itself.  Fundamental rights is a relatively broad category 
that includes far more rights than simply the rights to marry and have 
children, while the mutability doctrine is a narrow rule that limits Title 
VII to prohibiting sex discrimination only when it is based on immutable 
traits.  Thus, the mutability doctrine loses clarity and credibility when 
courts expand the theory to include other more expansive categories. 
Beyond its inconsistency with precedent, the mutability doctrine 
should be rejected because it fundamentally misinterprets the language 
of Title VII. A cursory examination of the text rebuts the central 
principle of the mutability doctrine because religion is one of the 
protected categories under Title VII.72  Although some persons might 
consider their religious beliefs inalterable, the possibility of conversion 
or lapse and the strong behavioral component of religion support the 
assertion that religion is a mutable trait.73  If this assertion is accepted, 
71. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.  In this seminal “haircut” case, an employer 
refused to hire a male applicant because his shoulder length hair violated the employer’s 
appearance policy, which required male employees, but not female employees, to keep 
their hair short.  Id. at 1087.  The court declared that Congress’s main intent in enacting 
Title VII was to ensure equal employment opportunity, and that such a goal would be 
achieved when employers were prohibited from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of immutable characteristics, such as sex, race, color, and national origin.  Id. at 
1091.  Thus, the hiring policy did not violate Title VII because hair length is a mutable 
characteristic.  Id.  In light of the Phillips and Sprogis opinions, however, the court was 
forced to admit that a policy based on fundamental rights may also violate Title VII.  Id.
Yet the court remained steadfast in its holding because hair length is neither an 
immutable trait nor a fundamental right.  Id.
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
73. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) (noting that protection of religious 
beliefs and marital status is an inherent contradiction in American antidiscrimination law 
because neither is immutable); Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don’t Ask; If It Is, 
Don’t Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 
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the mutability doctrine necessarily fails in its inability to account for the 
protection of religion under Title VII.  As noted by Judge McCree’s 
dissent in Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., if Title VII were limited to 
immutable characteristics, the prohibition against religious discrimination 
would be meaningless.74
The mutability doctrine also wrongly assumes that the only purpose of 
Title VII is to provide equal access to the job market, and thus, where 
the employer’s policy allows the employee to accept or reject the 
grooming requirement along with the job, Title VII is not violated.75
This line of reasoning misunderstands the intent behind Title VII.  The 
mere fact that the employee has the ability to change his or her 
appearance to comply with the policy should be irrelevant under the 
statute.76  Title VII is not concerned with whether the employee could 
have chosen to conform to the policy.77  If this were true, a policy of 
promoting only men to management positions would be considered 
lawful because female employees could simply choose to accept the 
promotion policy along with the job.  This result would be illogical 
under a statute that was intended to proscribe such discriminatory policies.  
Thus, Title VII’s protections do not turn on whether the employee had 
403–04 (1995) (arguing that religion is not immutable because it is not genetic, one can 
change religions, and religion is usually defined by behaviors—when and where one 
prays, how one lives, and if one wears religious garments). 
 74. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 403 n.3 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., 
dissenting) (“It is difficult to understand how such a limitation could be consistent with 
the proscription, also within [Title VII], of discrimination because of an employee's 
religion.  An employee’s religion is certainly not immutable.”). 
75. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“If the employee objects to the grooming 
code he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively 
he may choose to subordinate his preference by accepting the code along with the job.”); 
see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 847–48 (1987). 
 76. Bayer, supra note 75, at 848 (“The fact that the discriminatee may alter 
behavior to conform with the policy is immaterial because, under the statute, the 
discriminatee does not have to tolerate making such a choice.”). 
77. Id. (“Rather, the single appropriate inquiry is whether the alleged discriminatee 
has been subjected to a policy, term, or condition based on an impermissible criterion.  If 
the answer is yes, and if the policy cannot be substantiated by a statutory exemption or 
defense, the employer is liable.”).  Bayer also provides an interesting hypothetical to 
illustrate this point: 
Indeed, if the courts subscribing to this line of reasoning are correct, Title VII 
would allow a wide variety of policies that contemporary case law has held 
illegal.  For instance, an employer’s policy refusing to promote blacks from 
menial positions might be held lawful.  To paraphrase the [Willingham] Court: 
“If the [black menial] employee objects to the [promotion] code he has the 
right to reject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may 
choose to subordinate his preference [for opportunity for promotion] by 
accepting the code along with the job.” 
   Surely, the above result is anathema to Title VII policy and practice. 
Id. (citation omitted) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original). 
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the choice or ability to conform to the policy, but rather whether the 
policy discriminates on the basis of a protected category.78
Finally, the mutability doctrine should be eliminated because it 
assumes that Title VII only prohibits discriminatory policies that the court 
deems sufficiently important or worthy of judicial review.  To avoid 
dealing with policies that regulate mutable characteristics, such as groom 
and dress standards, courts applying the mutability doctrine have often 
asserted that such policies are so frivolous and unimportant that they do 
not merit Title VII review.79  For example, in Baker v. California Land 
Title Co., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 
subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, instructed that: 
[Title VII] was never intended . . . [to] be used to interfere in the promulgation 
and enforcement of the general rules of employment, deemed essential by an 
employer . . . [and] it certainly should not be used, as the defendant asks us to 
do here, to compel the continued employment of an employee who persists in 
affecting some whim of style which his employer deems to be inappropriate to 
the business image which the employer is attempting to create.80
There, the district court adopted a de minimis approach to the employee’s 
Title VII challenge, asserting that the statute was not intended to address 
such minor issues.81  The Sixth Circuit invoked a similarly dismissive 
tone when refusing to consider the implications of Title VII for an 
employer’s appearance policy, stating that “[e]mployer grooming codes 
requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such a 
negligible relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude 
they were a target of the Act.”82  In other words, because mutable 
characteristics such as hair length are easily changeable, a grooming and 
dress policy, even one that discriminates on the basis of sex, does not 
achieve the requisite level of importance for Title VII review.  However, 
Title VII’s protections do not turn on whether a judge deems the 
interests at stake sufficiently important; Title VII simply looks to 
whether the policy discriminates on the basis of a protected category.83
78. See id. at 854–55. 
79. See id. at 854. 
 80. Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis 
added), aff’d, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974). 
81. See id.
 82. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401(6th Cir. 1977). 
 83. Bayer, supra note 75, at 854–55 (“Certainly, limits have been set on Title VII’s 
scope; but Congress established those limits to reach far beyond the narrow 
interpretation of mutability analysis.  Title VII should not be constrained by a judge’s 
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Thus, the de minimis argument dangerously relies upon subjective judicial 
attitudes about the relative importance of appearance regulations, rather 
than focusing on whether the policy impermissibly discriminates against 
individual employees. 
Illogically, the de minimis argument allows courts to trivialize 
personal appearance while at the same time legitimizing its regulation.84
In the specific context of groom and dress policies, men’s interest in 
wearing their hair long has been repeatedly dismissed as minimal, while 
employers’ interest in forcing male employees to keep their hair short 
has been lauded as significant.85  In Baker, for instance, the district court 
described the employee’s refusal to cut his hair as “persist[ing] in 
affecting some whim of style” while simultaneously emphasizing the 
importance of the employer’s ability to enforce appearance rules and 
have complete control over its “business image.”86  However, Title VII’s 
protections should not turn on whether the employee has a worthy 
reason for refusing to comply with the policy.87  The statute does not 
place a higher value on an employer’s interest than on an employee’s. 
Although judges serve an important gatekeeping function by ensuring 
that court dockets are not bogged down by frivolous or unsupportable 
lawsuits, there are effective civil procedures, such as the motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, already in place to help judges 
concept of what is reasonable.  Either a policy discriminates or it does not.”).  In a 
discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, the Supreme Court also noted that 
“Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on national 
origin or race, are unlawful.”  City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978). 
 84. Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73, 73–74 (1982) (discussing the courts’ tendency to trivialize 
personal appearance while at the same time legitimating its regulation).  For example, in 
City of Seattle v. Buchanan, five women appealed convictions of lewd conduct for 
swimming topless in public.  584 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1978).  The Washington Supreme 
Court dismissed the women’s claims about the right to regulate their own appearance as 
unimportant, id. at 921, but by upholding the convictions, actually affirmed the 
importance of city’s ability to regulate women’s appearance.  Whisner, supra, at 74. 
 85. See Whisner, supra note 84, at 74, and sources cited therein. 
86. Baker, 349 F. Supp. at 238.  For further discussion on the conflict between 
dismissing employees’ interests and emphasizing employers’ interests, see Karl E. Klare, 
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1401 
(1992).  Klare argues: 
There is . . . a tendency to denigrate and demean appearance claims, a faint 
suggestion that courts have better things to do with their time than adjudicate 
grooming standards.  Suddenly the tone becomes somber and the message 
almost eerily apocalyptic when judges get to the part of their opinion where 
they uphold, as they usually do, the power of employers, school administrators, 
and others to visit severe penalties on people who wear nonconforming dress 
or hairstyles. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 87. Bayer, supra note 75, at 854–55. 
MALCOM 6/15/2009 8:09:31 PM 
[VOL. 46:  505, 2009] “Looking and Feeling Your Best” 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 523
determine whether a particular lawsuit is appropriate for adjudication.88
The mutability doctrine, however, goes beyond these existing procedures 
to effectively bar the application of Title VII to any groom and dress 
policy, based solely on the assertion that appearance is mutable and thus 
not sufficiently important to merit judicial attention. 
Accordingly, this Comment recommends the rejection of the mutability 
doctrine because it contradicts Supreme Court precedent, misinterprets 
the language and purpose of Title VII, and forecloses the possibility that 
a groom and dress policy could violate Title VII.  As long as courts continue 
to utilize the mutability doctrine, groom and dress plaintiffs will be 
systematically dismissed, regardless of whether the challenged policy is 
rooted in sex stereotypes or imposes a heavier burden upon female 
employees.  Thus, the Supreme Court should eliminate this doctrine in 
order to allow the courts to consider each groom and dress challenge on 
its merits. 
B.  The Offensive Stereotype Analysis: Community Norms                  
Versus Normative Judgments 
The offensive stereotype analysis provides that an appearance policy 
violates Title VII if the policy is motivated by demeaning or offensive 
sex-based stereotypes.89 Although groom and dress plaintiffs have achieved 
some limited success with the offensive stereotype analysis,90 the 
analysis is rendered nearly ineffective by the court-created distinction 
between offensive stereotypes and commonly accepted social norms.  
Because commonly accepted social norms arise out of mainstream 
society, they are inevitably informed by the society’s entrenched sexist 
88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
89. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 
1979) (holding that a rule that requires only women to wear uniforms violates Title VII 
because “it is based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.”).  The offensive 
stereotype analysis has been applied to groom and dress polices by courts in the Sixth, 
see infra note 90, Seventh, see Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033, and Eighth Circuits, see infra
note 102. 
90. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33 (describing a rule requiring women to wear 
uniforms but allowing men to wear business attire as “demeaning to women”); see also
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 
1987) (holding that a rule requiring that female sales clerks at a retail store wear smocks, 
while male sales clerks were allowed to wear a shirt and tie, perpetuated sexual 
stereotypes and violated Title VII); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 
(N.D. Ohio 1971) (holding that an employer may not base its regulations on gender 
stereotypes, such as “women are the weaker sex,” without violating Title VII). 
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and patriarchal attitudes, the mitigation of which spurred the passage of 
Title VII in the first place.91  Thus, by immunizing a category of 
stereotypes that find justification in the values and images held in the 
community, this distinction improperly allows courts to withhold Title 
VII protection based on subjective beliefs about whether certain gender 
stereotypes are permissible.92  Further, upholding appearance policies by 
reference to social norms actually incorporates and legitimizes the very 
stereotypes that Title VII intended to eliminate.93
The distinction between offensive stereotypes and community norms 
first arose in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n.94  In 
Carroll, an employer’s dress code required female employees to wear a 
uniform, consisting of either a color-coordinated skirt or slacks and 
either a jacket, tunic, or vest, but allowed men in the same position to 
wear business suits or business-type sport jackets, pants, and ties.95  By 
way of explanation, the employer expressed his concern that female 
employees would not have the proper business judgment to choose 
appropriate attire: 
[T]he selection of attire, of clothing, on the part of women is not a matter of business 
judgment.  It is a matter of taste, a matter of what the other women are wearing, what 
fashion is currently.  When we get into that realm . . . problems develop.  Somehow, 
the women who have excellent business judgment somehow follow the fashion, and 
the slit-skirt fashion which is currently prevalent.96
 91. Klare, supra note 86, at 1417–18. 
92. See Bayer, supra note 75, at 868 (“Only a court’s subjective predilections can 
explain a ruling that requiring women to wear uniforms is unlawful, but requiring men to 
cut their hair is not.”). 
 93. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2544 
(1994).  For an extensive discussion of how legal institutions and civil concepts, like 
equality, are rooted in the patriarchal and sexist attitudes that dominated legal 
scholarship from the birth of the United States, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).  MacKinnon argues, in 
part, that the core of our political and legal system is inherently patriarchal because it 
was founded during a time when women had no voice or representation in government.  
Id. at 1282–85.  She states that “laws developed when women were not allowed to learn 
to read and write, far less vote, enunciated by a state built on the silence of women, 
predicated on a society in which women were chattel, literally or virtually.”  Id. at 1285.  
For an introductory examination of how women’s movements have worked to combat 
sexism and patriarchy in the law and society generally, see ROSEMARIE PUTNAM TONG,
FEMINIST THOUGHT: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2d ed., 1998).  For 
example, an early movement called liberal feminism seeks to end female subordination 
and systematic sex discrimination by working within the system to obtain political, civil, 
and economic equality for women.  Id. at 11.  On the other hand, radical feminism rejects 
the entire sex–gender system as inherently oppressive towards women, and instead 
desires an androgynous or female emphasized society.  Id. at 45–47. 
 94. 604 F.2d 1028. 
95. Id. at 1029. 
96. Id. at 1033 (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original). 
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The Seventh Circuit held that the employer’s comments revealed that his 
dress code was improperly motivated by an offensive stereotype—that 
women cannot be trusted to choose appropriate business apparel—and 
that this was the very kind of “offensive stereotype” that Title VII intended 
to eliminate.97
Although the Seventh Circuit strengthened the concept of sex 
stereotyping for Title VII plaintiffs by properly recognizing that the 
employer’s dress code violated Title VII,98 the Carroll opinion also 
limited the ability of Title VII plaintiffs to successfully utilize evidence 
of sex stereotyping by stating that “[s]o long as [appearance policies] 
find some justification in commonly accepted social norms . . . such 
regulations are not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the 
standards prescribed differ somewhat for men and women.”99  This 
sentence, although dicta, opened the door for other courts to justify 
discriminatory groom and dress policies by holding that such policies are 
based on commonly accepted social norms rather than offensive 
stereotypes.100  In doing so, courts rely upon norms and images that are 
necessarily informed by the patriarchal and sexist attitudes that Congress 
sought to mitigate when it passed Title VII.  In this sense, the offensive 
stereotype analysis may actually work against the statute’s goals. 
The distinction between offensive and commonly accepted stereotypes 
should be avoided because it improperly allows courts to permit or 
withhold Title VII coverage based on subjective judgments about the 
permissibility or worthiness of certain gender stereotypes.101 This problem 
is exemplified in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of the forced feminization 
of a local news anchor.102  In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., a female anchor 
alleged that she was demoted to the position of reporter due to her 
failure to appear sufficiently feminine.103  The court held that she failed 
to prove that the station’s appearance policies were impermissibly 
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1032 (emphasis added). 
100. See Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2543–44 (noting that “[e]mployers have 
traditionally assumed substantial prerogatives with respect to the dress and appearance of 
their employees,” and that “[f]or the most part, courts have rationalized dress and appearance 
requirements by reference, directly or indirectly, to community norms”). 
101. See Bayer, supra note 75, at 868 (“Only a court’s subjective predilections can 
explain a ruling that requiring women to wear uniforms is unlawful, but requiring men to 
cut their hair is not.”). 
 102. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
103. Id. at 1207. 
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motivated by “stereotypical notions of female roles and images,”104
despite ample evidence that the station expected all of its female 
employees to appear soft and feminine when on the air.  For example, 
Craft was told to purchase blouses with “feminine touches,” such as 
bows or ruffles, because her clothes were “too masculine,”105 and the 
station’s appearance consultants took Craft on shopping trips to help her 
pick out appropriately feminine clothing.106  The Eighth Circuit noted 
that dress policies that violate Title VII are generally based on 
“demeaning stereotypes as to female characteristics and abilities or 
stereotypical notions of female attractiveness.”107  The court then 
concluded that the station’s feminization of Craft was not demeaning, 
but simply a result of “the greater degree of conservatism thought 
necessary in the Kansas City market.”108  But, as discussed below, Title 
VII does not allow discrimination in order to meet customer preference.  
Further, the court’s explanation clearly reveals that the court withheld the 
protections of Title VII because the stereotypes, which informed the 
station’s policies that women should appear soft and feminine, were not 
considered sufficiently offensive to constitute sex discrimination.  In 
this sense, the dichotomy between community norms and offensive 
stereotypes incorrectly assumes “that Title VII only proscribes treatment 
based on unusual or extreme stereotypes.”109  Such an assumption 
undermines Title VII because the statute is rendered ineffective if the 
only forms of discrimination it fights are “those which . . . [a court decides] 
are no longer socially worthwhile.”110  Title VII’s blanket prohibition on 
sex discrimination does not allow for selective enforcement,111 and thus 
courts must implement a broader method of discerning which 
stereotypes violate Title VII. 
The offensive stereotype analysis also fails to fulfill the purpose of 
Title VII by allowing courts and employers to justify discriminatory 
policies by reference to customer preference.112  As mentioned above, in 
Craft, the Eighth Circuit also upheld the station’s appearance policy by 
asserting that television is a visual medium and that the station’s 
economic well-being depends in part on ensuring that the news anchors 
appeal to the customer audience.113  However, Title VII does not permit 
104. Id. at 1215–16. 
105. Id. at 1214. 
106. Id. at 1208–09. 
107. Id. at 1215 n.12. 
108. Id. at 1215. 
 109. Bayer, supra note 75, at 868. 
110. Id.
111. Id. at 855–56. 
112. See id. at 872. 
113. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215. 
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discrimination when the employer can prove that his or her customers 
prefer the stereotypical image.114  To the contrary, Title VII makes no 
distinction between businesses that serve a small group of customers 
with little or no personal contact with employees and businesses that 
involve contact with millions of customers, such as a television news 
station.115  Moreover, the customer preference argument would allow courts 
to apply Title VII inconsistently, basing the statute’s protections on each 
jurisdiction’s particular level of acceptance for sexist stereotypes.  Such 
an approach would only result in more confusion and uncertainty for 
both employers and employees under the statute.  Title VII’s unambiguous 
language and sweeping protections do not provide an exception for 
employers that discriminate because their customers prefer a stereotypical 
image, and thus, the customer preference argument must be rejected. 
Finally, the dichotomy between offensive and commonly accepted 
should be further rejected because community norms are necessarily 
informed by the discriminatory atmosphere that Congress sought to 
eradicate with the enactment of Title VII.116  Therefore, courts that apply 
this analysis actually empower employers to reinforce stereotypical 
notions about sex and gender through the regulation of appearance.117
By definition, commonly accepted stereotypes arise out of “mainstream 
 114. As discussed supra note 31, Title VII allows an employer to prove that a 
discriminatory policy is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) 
(2000).  However, the bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) statutory defense is 
extremely narrow and imposes a heavy burden of persuasion upon the employer.  In 
particular, several lower courts have rejected the “customer preference” argument as a 
valid basis under the BFOQ defense.  See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (“BFOQ ought not be based on ‘the refusal to hire an 
individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or 
customers.’”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding 
that male customers’ preference for attractive female flight attendants does not give rise 
to BFOQ exception to sex discrimination).  For further discussion of the limits of the 
BFOQ defense, see Rachel L. Cantor, Consumer Preferences for Sex and Title VII: 
Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 493 (1999). 
 115. Bayer, supra note 75, at 872. 
 116. Bartlett, supra note 93 (noting that courts have rationalized dress and 
appearance requirements by reference to community norms, an approach that some 
scholars criticize as “constitut[ing] an acceptance or legitimation of the very gender 
stereotypes that Title VII was established to eliminate”). 
117. See Klare, supra note 86, at 1419–20 (“This body of law is obviously based 
upon and reinforces stereotypical, gendered views about appearance.  To put it another 
way, this part of civil rights law has the significant social function of delegating to 
employers the power and authority to police and reinforce gender lines.”). 
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or conventional norms, which in our society are thoroughly sexist and 
patriarchal.”118  Thus, when courts allow employers to punish employees 
for deviating from commonly accepted norms, courts facilitate the sexist 
ideas and images that Title VII was meant to eliminate.  As one legal 
scholar noted, “When ‘commonly accepted social norms’ disadvantage 
women, the countenancing of an employment practice that takes its 
justification from those norms defeats the purpose of a statute proscribing 
sex discrimination.”119  Indeed, Title VII was not enacted to follow the 
current trends, but rather to eliminate trends when they impermissibly 
rely upon sexist notions of the proper roles for men and women.120
When courts allow employers to force their employees to conform to 
community norms that are based on harmful sex stereotypes, such 
stereotypes thrive and the pervasive sexism in mainstream society 
prevents the central purpose of Title VII from being realized.121
C.  The Unequal Burdens Test: A Legal Loophole to Discriminate? 
The unequal burdens test compares the relative burdens imposed by an 
appearance policy upon employees of each sex, and if the court 
determines that one group of employees has a more onerous or stringent 
burden than the other, the policy violates Title VII.122  This analysis has 
been used to strike down facially discriminatory policies,123 as well as 
118. Id. at 1417–18. 
 119. Whisner, supra note 84, at 84 (footnote omitted); see also Klare, supra note 
86, at 1415 (“Indeed, in some respects, Title VII powerfully reinforces gender 
stereotypes and makes socially constructed gender differences appear to be natural and 
unchangeable.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Similarly, the passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 
required schools to end sex segregation in vocational programs.  See NAT’L COAL. FOR 
WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX AT 30: REPORT CARD ON GENDER EQUITY 21–26 
(2002).  Prior to Title IX, the vocational education system was purposefully sex 
segregated.  Id. (“Schools routinely denied girls the opportunity to take classes in shop, 
manufacturing, architectural drafting, and ceramics or to attend certain vocational 
schools.”)  The passage of Title IX meant that schools could no longer discriminate on 
the basis of gender in these educational and vocational programs.  Id.  Thus, equal rights 
legislation like Title VII and Title IX must be viewed as affirmative tools to change
social values when they disadvantage one sex. 
 121. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards 
Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (2006). 
 122. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2561 (“Other courts have seemed to engage in a 
more qualitative review, implying that the burdens on men and women must be at least 
roughly comparable, by some criterion or another.”). 
123. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that an airline’s policy of requiring only flight hostesses to comply with strict 
weight requirements as a condition of their employment was discriminatory on its face 
because it applied only to women, not to men).  In Gerdom, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished that case from the haircut cases, noting that “no significantly greater 
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policies that regulate both men and women but treat one sex less favorably 
than the other.124  Although the comparative framework of the unequal 
burdens test is appealingly simple, courts should carefully scrutinize the 
individual requirements to determine whether the burdens are equal and 
should not simply dismiss the claim if the policy has some requirements 
for both men and women.  Further, the factors most courts consider 
when comparing the burdens are generally limited to the financial, 
temporal, and occasionally the physical costs of compliance.125  These 
factors ignore a key element of the burdens analysis: the emotional cost 
of complying with a discriminatory policy. 
Courts should examine the policy in its individual restrictions and 
requirements, rather than as a whole, to avoid an oversimplified, ledger-
style inspection of the policy.  In other words, considering the policy as 
a whole allows courts to simply add up the number of requirements for 
each sex and ensure that the number is equal, whereas examining each 
requirement of the policy individually allows courts to determine whether 
any specific requirement is more burdensome for one sex than the other.126
For example, in Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit stated that the makeup 
requirement should not be considered individually but in light of the 
policy as a whole.127  Because the policy imposed sex-differentiated 
requirements regarding each employee’s hair, hands, and face, the court 
held that the policy imposed equal burdens upon both sexes.128  However, 
had the court examined the requirements individually, it would have 
burden of compliance was imposed on either sex; that is the key consideration.”  Id. at 
606. See also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that 
an airline can require all flight attendants to wear contacts instead of glasses, but it 
cannot require only its female flight attendants to do so). 
124. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that an airline’s weight restrictions violated Title VII because the weight limits for men 
corresponded to “large” body frames while the weight maximums for women 
corresponded to the “medium” body frames, and thus the policy imposed a heavier 
burden of compliance upon female flight attendants). 
125. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc).  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Jespersen’s unequal burdens claim 
considered only the time and financial cost of compliance. 
 126. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2561.  Recognizing this very problem, Bartlett 
noted: “Courts have engaged in little or no comparative analysis of the burdens men and 
women, respectively, face.  In some cases it has been enough that some requirements 
were imposed on both men and women, regardless of how burdensome or demeaning 
either set of requirements might be.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
127. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
128. Id. at 1109. 
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found that each requirement for men corresponded to a requirement that 
was at least as, if not more, burdensome for women.129  For example, 
men were required to keep their hair “short,” while women were required to 
keep their hair “teased, curled or styled” and worn down every day.130
As to the hands, men were merely required to have neat, trimmed nails, 
while women had nail length and polish color requirements.131  Finally, 
and most noticeably, men were only required to come to work with a 
clean face, whereas women were required to wear face powder, blush, 
mascara, and lip color in complimentary colors.132  Once the individual 
requirements are broken down, it becomes apparent that the Personal 
Best policy imposed a heavier burden upon female employees.133  Thus, 
courts should apply a qualitative analysis of an appearance policy’s 
individual requirements, rather than a facile quantitative analysis that 
only ensures that each sex is subject to approximately the same number 
of restrictions and rules. 
Further, courts should broadly consider the financial, temporal, physical, 
and emotional costs of complying with the policy when evaluating the 
relative burdens upon employees.  Courts have already considered the 
physical costs of compliance with groom and dress policies.  For 
instance, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., a class of female former flight 
attendants alleged that United Airlines’ weight restrictions violated Title 
VII by imposing a heavier burden upon women.134  The weight restrictions 
were based on a table of desirable weights and heights published by the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, but a closer inspection revealed 
that the weight limits for men corresponded to “large” body frames and 
those for women corresponded to “medium” body frames.135  In holding 
that the policy violated Title VII, the Ninth Circuit took into consideration 
the physical costs of the policy, noting that many of the female flight 
attendants had jeopardized their health in order to stay within the weight 
129. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
130. Id.  Although Judge Kozinski agreed with the majority that the makeup 
requirement should be considered in light of the entire policy, he still found that the 
policy imposed a greater burden upon women and analyzed the policy by breaking it 
down into individual requirements.  Id.
131. Id. at 1107 (majority opinion). 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Even without a record of the money and 
time required to comply with the Personal Best policy, Kozinski found it “perfectly clear 
that Harrah’s overall grooming policy is substantially more burdensome for women than 
for men” by breaking down the individual requirements and examining each for the 
burden it imposed on the employee.  Id.
 134. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000). 
135. Id.
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requirement by severely restricting caloric intake, using diuretics, and 
purging.136
Financial and temporal costs are also significant factors when considering 
the burdens imposed upon employees.  These costs are easily quantifiable 
as the tangible indicia of time and money required to comply with the 
policy.137  For example, in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the district 
court found that the defendant’s appearance policy violated Title VII by 
forbidding women, but not men, from wearing eyeglasses.138  The court 
noted that the policy imposed a heavier burden on women because 
contact lenses “are substantially more expensive than eyeglasses with 
lenses of comparable quality.”139  However, by limiting the unequal 
burdens analysis to the temporal, financial, and physical costs associated 
with appearance policies, courts ignore the emotional cost of complying 
with a discriminatory policy.  As the next section explains, the emotional 
cost of compliance with an appearance policy is an important factor for 
courts to consider because it may indicate that the policy is impermissibly 
based upon sexist stereotypes. 
V. A NEW APPROACH: RETURNING TO TITLE VII AND                                 
THE SUPREME COURT
Turning to this Comment’s proposed approach, courts should begin by 
considering whether the groom and dress policy at issue relies upon 
stereotypes that tend to reinforce gender inequality in the workplace.  
This analysis avoids the quagmire of attempting to distinguish offensive 
stereotypes from community norms and returns the court’s focus to the 
original intent of Title VII: eliminating the traditional barriers and 
disadvantages faced by women entering the workforce.  Feminist and 
legal scholar Katherine T. Bartlett writes that although it is true that 
community norms are “too discriminatory to provide a satisfactory 
benchmark for defining workplace equality . . . .  [E]quality, no less than other 
legal concepts, cannot transcend the norms of the community that has 
136. Id.
 137. Jespersen did not have such an easy time of proving the financial and temporal 
costs of complying with the Personal Best policy.  Because she did not keep a record of 
such matters and the Ninth Circuit refused to take judicial notice of the cost and time of 
makeup application, she failed to create a triable issue of fact for her unequal burdens 
analysis.  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106. 
 138. Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973). 
139. Id. at 774. 
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produced it.”140  Courts will never be able to provide an objective answer 
to whether a certain appearance requirement is offensive or acceptable, 
because courts are necessarily informed by the sexist and patriarchal 
attitudes that permeate our society.  The offensive stereotype analysis 
offers what appears to be a clean, objective inquiry—asking whether the 
stereotype is offensive—but if considered in a broader social context, the 
analysis is embedded in and undermined by sexist societal expectations 
and images. 
On the other hand, a blanket prohibition on sex-based distinctions in 
appearance policies is unrealistic.  As one author noted, “In a sexist society, 
nothing done by men and women has precisely the same meaning.  
Traits are not understood or viewed as isolated technical attributes.  
They are necessarily viewed in relation to all of the other traits an 
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered lens.”141  For 
instance, in Price Waterhouse, the same behavior—aggressiveness and 
competitiveness—was interpreted in very different ways according to 
the gender of the person performing the behavior.142  Any sex-based 
distinction in appearance policies arguably relies upon sex stereotypes, 
and the meaning accorded to behavior and appearance is necessarily 
shaped by society.  Thus, it is illogical, and unrealistic, to demand sex 
blindness in employment when sex blindness does not exist in greater 
society. 
Rather than banning all sex-specific appearance policies, courts should 
focus on whether the stereotype reinforces gender inequality and limits 
employment opportunities for women.  In doing so, courts must examine 
the historical and cultural roots of the subordination of women.  If the 
appearance requirement at issue is based on a stereotype that has been 
used to disempower, stigmatize, or oppress one sex, the stereotype is 
impermissible and the policy violates Title VII.  This analysis will allow 
courts to invalidate groom and dress policies that serve to reinforce 
women’s lesser status in the workplace while leaving alone the 
 140. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2544–45. 
 141. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a 
More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 
889 (2006). 
 142. As Yuracko noted: 
It is simply not the case that Hopkins was fired for exhibiting the same 
behavior that her male coworkers exhibited.  Social meanings are real.  
Aggressiveness in women is bitchy in a way that aggressiveness in men is not.  
Competitiveness in women is threatening in a way that competitiveness in men 
is not.  Vulgarity in women is shocking and disturbing in a way that vulgarity 
in men is not.  Even if Ann Hopkins had engaged in the same types of conduct 
as her male colleagues, her behavior would not have been socially the same. 
Id. at 890. 
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harmless—or even beneficial—sex-specific groom and dress policies.  
The comparison of two seemingly equivalent appearance requirements, 
that men must wear business suits and ties and women must wear skirts, 
provides a useful illustration of this new approach.  Both requirements 
are admittedly based on sex-specific stereotypes.  However, because 
business attire traditionally communicates professionalism, confidence, 
and respect, a requirement that men wear suits and ties does not degrade 
the male employee.143  If anything, the suit-and-tie requirement benefits 
the male wearer by allowing him to fit the role of a successful, powerful 
employee.144  On the other hand, the stereotype that women must wear 
skirts has deep historical and cultural significance to a variety of 
demeaning or disempowering beliefs, including the notions that women 
are weak, are passive, and should maintain their sex appeal.145  Both 
stereotypes are, to a degree, limiting, in that some men may prefer to 
wear skirts and some women may prefer to wear pants, but both groups 
would be prevented from doing so by a stereotypically sex-based dress 
code.  However, the skirt stereotype clearly poses a distinct disadvantage 
for women seeking to be taken seriously in a business environment by 
adding a sexual component to the job.  Thus, under the new approach 
advocated by this Comment, the skirt requirement would violate Title 
VII because it is impermissibly based on a stereotype that reinforces 
female subordination, while the suit-and-tie requirement would be left 
alone as harmless, or perhaps even empowering, to male employees. 
Of course, courts may not be able to completely transcend many of the 
patriarchal norms and images built into contemporary social, political, 
and legal systems.  But by moving the court’s focus from the subjective 
concept of offensiveness to historical and sociological studies of gender 
subordination and inequality, the proposed approach commands a more 
objective review of the policy’s requirements.  The goal of this new 
approach is not to strip any mention of sex or gender from appearance 
policies or impose sex blindness on every aspect of employment, but 
simply to recognize and eliminate those policies that compel compliance 
with stereotypes that strengthen the traditional inequalities between men 
and women in the workplace.146
 143. Miller, supra note 121, at 1367. 
144. Id.
145. Id.
 146. Of course, an appearance policy that imposes gender-neutral requirements and 
restrictions—that all employees wear their hair neatly or that no employee reveal their 
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Given the recent strides women have made towards equality in the 
workforce, some may assert that the historical connection between 
gender inequality and feminine appearance—or more specifically for 
Jespersen, the forced application of makeup—is no longer relevant.  
However, as noted feminist author Naomi Wolf writes, it is precisely 
this progress that requires society to pay further attention to the methods 
and forms that gender subordination takes.147  The more progress women 
make in work outside the home, “the more strictly and heavily and 
cruelly images of female beauty have come to weigh upon us.”148  Wolf 
asserts that the advancement in gender equality has resulted in a 
backlash against feminism “that uses images of female beauty as a 
political weapon against women’s advancement.”149  In the groom and 
dress context, the imposition of burdensome and demeaning sex 
stereotypes through appearance policies may be viewed as a response to 
the increasing number of women gaining expertise and importance in the 
workforce.  Thus, as women continue to work towards equality with 
men in all aspects of employment, the solution is not to back away from 
or ignore potentially discriminatory policies, but instead to take up the 
goals of Title VII with renewed vigor, and to carefully scrutinize those 
policies for requirements that rely on gender inequality. 
Had the Ninth Circuit employed this new approach when considering 
Jespersen’s sex stereotyping claim, Jespersen would have likely prevailed.  
Perhaps assuming that Title VII only prohibits extreme or unpopular 
policies, the Ninth Circuit deemed the Personal Best policy to be 
“reasonable” and adopted a dismissive attitude toward Jespersen’s claim, 
noting that a single employee’s aversion to wearing makeup cannot 
serve as the basis of a Title VII challenge.150  However, applying the 
approach advocated in this Comment, the court would have examined 
the Personal Best policy in light of extensive historical and sociological 
studies of the connections between makeup and the subordination of 
midriff—would still pass muster under the proposed approach.  Further, an appearance 
policy that permits but does not require employees to conform to sex stereotypes would 
also be found lawful under the proposed approach.  For instance, if Harrah’s had 
permitted but not required its female employees to wear makeup, the policy would not be 
found to violate Title VII.  Again, this Author’s goal is not to prohibit any mention of 
sex in appearance policies but simply to prevent employers from reinforcing gender 
inequality by forcibly imposing sex stereotypes upon its employees. 
 147. NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED 
AGAINST WOMEN 13–19 (1991). 
148. Id. at 10. 
149. Id.
 150. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc).
MALCOM 6/15/2009 8:09:31 PM 
[VOL. 46:  505, 2009] “Looking and Feeling Your Best” 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 535
women.151  Over the centuries, makeup has signified a variety of ideas 
from promiscuity and immorality, to economic wealth, to political and 
sexual oppression, and even to racism.152  Here, the forced feminization 
of the Personal Best Policy added an unnecessary and uncomfortable 
sexual component to Jespersen’s job function, impairing her ability to 
maintain authority in the tense atmosphere of gambling and alcohol.153
Although some women may personally enjoy wearing makeup, when an 
employer forces its female employee to wear makeup in an environment 
that requires the employee to maintain the respect of her unruly customers, 
that policy should be found to reinforce the subordination of women in 
the workplace.154  As the dissent in the en banc rehearing of Jespersen
affirmed, one need not condemn makeup as inherently offensive to 
conclude that forcing female bartenders to wear a full uniform of 
makeup to work is based on an impermissible stereotype.155
The second step of the proposed approach requires courts to engage in 
an expanded unequal burdens analysis by examining the financial, 
temporal, physical, and emotional costs of the policy.  As discussed 
above, courts already consider the temporal, financial, and physical 
 151. The Supreme Court has long been willing to look outside the realm of law for 
scientific, economic, historical, and sociological information to help guide decisions in 
new or uncharted areas and to aid statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (relying on scientific and sociological studies about the 
psychological development of teenagers in determining that the execution of individuals 
who were under the age of eighteen at the time that they committed the capital crime was 
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 170 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (utilizing historical 
studies of the U.S. market and financial and banking encyclopedias to determine that 
commercial paper was not intended to be treated as an investment security under the 
McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) 
(drawing upon sociological studies regarding the susceptibility of college students to 
religious indoctrination and the degree of academic freedom at church-related universities in 
holding that the Higher Education Act did not violate the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11, 495 (1954) 
(relying on social science studies about the psychological effect of segregation on black 
students in rejecting the “separate but equal” doctrine in public schools). 
152. See Kathy Peiss, Making Up, Making Over: Cosmetics, Consumer Culture, 
and Women’s Identity, in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 311 (Victoria de Grazia & Ellen Furlough eds., 1996); see also Kathy 
Peiss, Feminism and the History of the Face, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BODY 161 
(Theodore R. Schatzki & Wolfgang Natter eds., 1996). 
 153. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), 
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
154. See Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 11. 
155. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
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effort required to comply with appearance policies, but the emotional 
costs of compliance are important to consider in an unequal burdens 
analysis because they may indicate that the policy is impermissibly 
based upon sexist stereotypes.  As one critic noted, “By weighing only 
time and cost burdens, courts ignore the feelings of degradation that 
accompany grooming standards based on harmful prejudices and 
stereotypes.”156  In this sense, the unequal burdens test—as it is currently 
applied—is an artificial solution because it fails to address the persistence of 
sex stereotypes within a seemingly equal policy.157  Demanding rigid 
conformity with gender stereotypes, even if enforced with equal vigor 
against both sexes, imposes a heavy burden upon employees because the 
stereotypes themselves are harmful.158  For example, the psychological 
burden inherent in the notion that women must comply with “artificial, 
exacting, and extensive” makeup requirements in order to appear professional, 
whereas men are apparently acceptable without any enhancement, makes 
it clear that the Personal Best policy in Jespersen imposed unequal burdens 
upon the sexes.159  By considering the emotional cost of complying with 
an appearance policy, courts will be better able to determine whether a 
particular policy is unduly burdensome to employees because it is based 
on sexist stereotypes, thus closing the gap between the unequal burdens 
analysis and the offensive stereotype test. 
The emotional costs of complying with an appearance policy may 
seem to be an overly subjective factor for courts to consider, but it would 
surely not be the first time a court has been required to evaluate 
intangible harms.  Emotional distress claims are recognized in a variety 
of settings, most notably in tort law.160  Plaintiffs may even recover for 
emotional distress in employment discrimination cases, such as wrongful 
termination.161  In the groom and dress context, courts would simply be 
required to evaluate the emotional cost of complying with the discriminatory 
policy and incorporate that factor in the unequal burdens analysis.  
Given the extent to which intangible harms are incorporated in other 
bodies of case law, this would not be an overly burdensome task. 
 156. Miller, supra note 121, at 1364. 
157. Id. at 1360. 
158. See Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 26–27. 
159. Id. at 26. 
160. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hoskins, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery 
is Foreseeable, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1019 (2006); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled 
Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805 
(2004).
161. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Gowens, Comment, You Hurt My Feelings, Now Pay Up: 
Should Objective Evidence Be Required to Support Claims for Emotional Distress 
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases?, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (2003). 
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Another potential criticism of the evaluation of emotional costs might 
be that, as the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen opined, the subjective reaction 
of a single employee is not enough to provide a basis for a Title VII 
challenge.162  The apparent reasoning of this statement is that if the rest 
of the employees choose to accept the policy, the policy must be 
acceptable.  However, as previously noted, Title VII’s protections do 
not turn on whether the employee is given a choice to accept the 
discriminatory policy along with the job, but whether the policy itself is 
discriminatory.163  Thus, if one employee challenges the policy and the 
court determines that the policy violates Title VII, that victory is no less 
important than if an entire class of employees had done so.  Finally, this 
criticism ignores the fact that the unequal burdens analysis is a relative 
comparison of the entire burden a policy imposes upon each sex, and the 
emotional cost of the appearance policy is just one factor in the analysis. 
Had the Ninth Circuit applied the second step of the proposed 
approach in Jespersen, Jespersen would have had a much stronger case 
for arguing that the Personal Best policy imposed a heavier burden on 
women.  Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed Jespersen’s unequal 
burdens claim in part because she failed to submit records regarding the 
time and cost of complying with the makeup requirement,164 those were 
not the only costs at stake.  For Jespersen, the true cost of the Personal 
Best policy was not the time it took to apply a full face of makeup 
everyday before work, or even the money spent on foundation, blush, 
mascara, and lipstick—though these costs are not insignificant—but the 
emotional toll of being forced to fit a stereotype of femininity that “made 
her feel sick, degraded, exposed” and “took away [her] credibility as an 
individual and as a person.”165  In order to comprehensively evaluate 
the relative burdens imposed by the Personal Best policy, the Ninth 
Circuit should have weighed Jespersen’s emotional response to the 
policy and its corresponding impact on her job performance. 
 162. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 75–78. 
164. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110. 
165. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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VI. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION: THE HAIRCUT CASES
The so-called haircut cases broadly affirmed the employer’s right to 
restrict male employees’ hair length because hair length is an easily 
altered characteristic, and Title VII was not intended to take away an 
employer’s right to regulate employees’ appearance.166 As explained 
above, these cases are unsound because the holdings are based on the 
mutability doctrine, which contradicts Supreme Court precedent and 
misinterprets the language and purpose of Title VII.167  It is important to 
note that most of the haircut cases took place in the 1970s during an era 
of great social and political change.  In their zeal to protect employers’ 
ability to regulate employees’ appearance, presiding courts may have 
been influenced by this social context and the kinds of ideas that “long-
haired youths”168 may have represented.  Today, the courts’ and employers’ 
fervent insistence that male employees’ keep their hair short might seem 
unnecessary and unreasonable.  Nevertheless, the haircut cases serve as 
valid precedent within circuit courts across the country. Thus, a Supreme 
Court ruling is necessary to bring about the much needed changes.  
Moreover, the myriad problems in the treatment of groom and dress 
policies under Title VII arise not out of the statute, but out of lower 
courts’ misguided interpretation of the statute.  The text of Title VII sets 
out a clear and succinct definition of discrimination.  Yet circuit courts 
have imposed several broad limitations upon enforcement of Title VII 
violations.  These court-created restrictions have thwarted Congress’s intent 
in enacting Title VII. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment’s proposed two-pronged approach for groom and dress 
policies under Title VII will return the focus to the statute’s original purpose 
of eliminating the traditional barriers to women in the workplace by 
discerning whether the policy at hand is rooted in stereotypes that 
reinforce gender inequality.  This new method will also comport with 
existing Supreme Court precedent from Phillips and Price Waterhouse
166. See supra Part IV.A. 
167. See supra Part IV.A. 
 168. Indeed, the seminal haircut case, Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing 
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), illustrates this point.  In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit 
noted that an “International Pop Festival” had recently been held in a neighboring village 
and was attended by 400,000 to 500,000 young people.  Id. at 1087.  “Bearded and long-
haired youths and scantily dressed young women flooded the countryside.  Use of drugs 
and marijuana was open.”  Id.  Thus, the employer was entitled to consider that the business 
community of Macon was “particularly sour on youthful long-haired males at the time of 
Willingham’s application.”  Id.
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because it interprets the protections of Title VII broadly and without any 
of the false limitations imposed by circuit courts. 
This new approach rejects the mutability doctrine because it conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent and fundamentally misinterprets the 
language and purpose of Title VII.  Moreover, the mutability doctrine must 
be discarded in its entirety because any application of the doctrine would 
deny Title VII review over groom and dress policies, due simply to 
the fact that they regulate mutable characteristics.  Meanwhile, this 
new approach combines and refines aspects of the offensive stereotype 
analysis and the unequal burdens test to mitigate some of the limitations 
and weaknesses produced by the tests in their existing format. 
First, the court should determine whether the policy is motivated by or 
relies upon stereotypes that tend to reinforce gender inequality in the 
workplace.  The court should examine the policy in the context of the 
historical and cultural roots of the subordination of women, and if the 
appearance requirement is based upon a stereotype that has been used to 
demean, stigmatize, or oppress women, the stereotype is impermissible 
and the policy violates Title VII.  If, however, the appearance requirement is 
benign, or even beneficial, to the sex upon which it is imposed, the 
policy does not violate Title VII. 
At the second stage of the analysis, the court should inquire whether 
the policy in question imposes a heavier burden of compliance on one 
sex over the other.  The court should examine the individual restrictions 
and requirements of the policy, rather than the policy as a whole, and it 
should consider a wide range of factors, including the temporal, 
financial, physical, and emotional costs of compliance.  If the policy is 
found to impose a more stringent or burdensome standard against one 
sex over the other, the policy violates Title VII. 
Darlene Jespersen risked a successful, twenty-year career by refusing 
to conform to an appearance policy that she believed to be unlawful, 
unnecessary, and even harmful to her job performance.169  She stated 
that the makeup requirement made her feel “very degraded and very 
demeaned,” and impaired her ability to command the respect of her 
unruly customers.170  Under the approach advocated by this Comment, 
Jespersen would have likely been successful in her Title VII claim.  
169. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077–78. 
 170. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077. 
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Under the first prong of this approach, the Personal Best policy at 
Harrah’s Casino violates Title VII because it is based on historically 
sexist stereotypes that portray women as passive, decorative sex objects,171
and thus impermissibly reinforces gender inequality in the workplace.  
Even if a court upheld the policy under the first prong, the policy’s 
makeup requirement imposes a heavier burden on female employees by 
requiring them to apply a complicated and expensive palette of makeup 
while men have no comparable requirement.172  Thus, despite Jespersen’s 
disappointing loss before the Ninth Circuit, this Author hopes that women 
like Jespersen continue to bring their groom and dress challenges before 
the courts.  The publicity and controversy surrounding such cases173 may 
encourage the Supreme Court to implement a new and more comprehensive 
method for analyzing groom and dress policies under Title VII, 
emphasizing an approach that will remain faithful to legislative intent 
and Supreme Court precedent by eradicating the harmful stereotypes 
faced all too often by women in the workforce. 
171. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
172. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107. 
173. See, e.g., Jon Christensen, Rouge Rogue, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 22, 
available at http://www.mother jones.com/news/hellraiser/2001/03/hellraiser.html; Jackson 
Lewis LLP, Harrah’s Policy Requiring Women to Wear Makeup Upheld by Federal 
Appeals Court, DAILY RECORDER, Feb. 23, 2005, available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/ 
legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=731; Judith A. Moldover, Maddened by Makeup, Law.com 
(Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1156425446367. 
